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INTRODUCTION

In January of 1996, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (the "Act") was
signed into law by President Clinton, amending § 43 of the Lanham Act to include a
remedy for the "dilution of famous marks."' Much of the legislative history to the Act
suggests that one of Congress' principal purposes in passing the Act was to provide
famous trademarks with consistent, uniform national protection against diluting uses.2
Many may wonder, however, whether this Act will also help to remedy some of the
other problems in applying the dilution doctrine which have plagued courts and
practitioners for years.
For instance, while it is well-established that noncommercial uses of a trademark
are not subject to the dilution doctrine, it is unclear whether quasi-commercial uses,
such as where the mark is used in a parody, satire or social commentary on goods in
commerce, are subject to a dilution claim.3 Another problem is redundancy, many
argue that there is overlap between the dilution and infringement doctrines.4 Some of
this overlap is probably a result of court determinations that consumer confusion, the
central consideration of an infringement action, is relevant to a dilution cause of action.
Courts have struggled with the issue of whether confusion should be part of a dilution
analysis since the inception of the dilution doctrine,5 and it is not at all clear whether
the new federal Act helps alleviate this problem. Another reason for the redundancy
is that the concept of confusion within the trademark infringement doctrine has been
expanded over the years. Congress could help resolve some of these problems by
more clearly defining the parameters of the dilution doctrine. Such clarification would
likely go a long way towards making dilution a more effective and accepted form of
relief for trademark holders. This paper will examine the Act's prospects for
clarifying the parameters of the dilution doctrine, by exploring the likely impact this
new federal statute will have on the application of the doctrine. At the very least, the
goal of this discussion will be to identify and illuminate issues that are left for courts
and legal scholars to grapple with in the wake of this legislation.
The discussion will begin with a short history of the dilution doctrine. It will then
proceed to examine the application of the doctrine, highlighting issues that have been

1. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985
(1996).
2. See 141 CONG. REc. S19310 (daily ed. December 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
See also 141 CONG. REc. H14317 (daily ed. December 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead); H.R. REP. No. 374, 104th Cong. (1995).
3. See ElliotB. Staffin, TheDilutionDoctrine: Towards a Reconciliationwith the Lanham
Act, 6 FORDHAM INTLL. PROP. MEDIA &ENT. L.J. 105, 168-75 (1995); Arlen W. Langvardt,
ProtectedMarks and ProtectedSpeech: Establishingthe FirstAmendment Boundariesin
TrademarkParodyCases,36 ViLL. L. REv. 1, 74-76 (1991).

4. See Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"Expansionof TrademarkRights: Is a Federal
DilutionStatute Necessary?,18 SE'rNHALL LEGIS. J. 433,459-60 (1994); Michael L. Taviss,
In Search ofa ConsistentTrademarkDilutionTest, 58 U. CiN.L. REv. 1449, 1458-59 (1990)

(citing Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
5. See Port, supra note 4, at 440-47; Taviss, supra note 4, at 1457-60.
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particularly troublesome for courts. Provisions of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995 will then be introduced and briefly discussed. Finally, the problems involved
in applying the dilution doctrine to quasi-commercial speech and the possible
redundancy of dilution with respect to infringement will be examined in the context
of relevant provisions of the 1995 Act.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the Dilution Doctrine
Frank Schechter is generally given credit for introducing the concept of dilution to
the United States in 1927 through his article, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection.6 Schechter maintained in this article that a law was needed that would
protect against more than confusion among trademarks, by preventing the "gradual
whittling away or dispersion of... [a mark's] identity and hold upon the public mind
...by its use upon noncompeting goods."'7 Schechter illustrated the need for this new
cause of action by discussing cases where a senior trademark holder's exact mark was
used on noncompeting goods, such as where the "Kodak" mark for cameras had been
used on bicycles and the "Rolls-Royce" mark for automobiles had been used on radio
parts.8 Subsequent to the publication of Schechter's article, and before the enactment
of any anti-dilution statutes, some court holdings seemed to be supportive of the
dilution concept 9 Nonetheless, most of these holdings relied upon, or at least claimed
to rely upon, some form of consumer confusion to reach their results.'"
The first anti-dilution statute was enacted by Massachusetts" in 1947; Illinois 2 and

6. Frank I.
Schechter, The RationalBasisof TrademarkProtection,40 HARv. L. REv. 813
(1927). See also Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationalefor Trademark- Trade
IdentityProtection,It's ProgressandProspects,71 NW. U.L. REv. 618, 618-19 (1976). The
origins ofdilution can be traced back even further, as Schechter acknowledged in his article. Id.
Schechter discussed case law from England, Germany and the United States in which courts had
granted relief to trademark owners against noncompeting uses. Id.
7. Schechter, supra note 6, at 825.
8. Schechter, supranote 6, at 825-30 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15
Rep. Pat. Cas. 105 (1898); Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1925)).
9. See, e.g., Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1932), aff'd, 260 A.D. 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932), affd, 188 N.E. 30 (N.Y. 1933Xa New
York court used Schechter's language of dilution in holding that a movie theater should be
enjoined from using the Tiffany &Co. jeweler's famous name); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahiti,
166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948Xcourt used language of dilution in granting restaurant owner
injunctive relief from a tavern owner's use of a very similar trademark); See Pattishall, supra
note 6, at 619.
10. See supra note 9; See also Taviss, supra note 4, at 1457.
11. Act ofMay 2, 1947, ch. 307, §7a, 1947 MAss. ACTS 300, cited in Pattishall, supra note
6, at 619 n.1 1 (codified as amended at MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 OB, § 12 (West 1992)).
Laws 455, cited in Pattishall, supra note 6,at 620
12. Act of June 24,1953, § 1, 1953 Ill.
n.20 (codified at 765 ILCS 1035/15 (1995)).
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New York 3 enacted such statutes soon thereafter in 1953 and 1955 respectively.
Today, roughly half the states have anti-dilution statutes. These statutes, most of
which are patterned after § 12 of the 1964 Model State Trademark Bill,' 4 uniformly
provide for injunctive relief to the trademark holder regardless of whether the marks
compete or consumers are confused." As will be discussed, however, courts have
been reluctant to recognize the apparent meaning of much of the language in these
statutes.6 For instance, courts have frequently refused to grant relief for dilution in the

absence of a showing of confusion, despite the fact that the applicable statutes
expressly eliminated a confusion requirement. 7

13. Act ofApril 18,1955, ch. 453, § 1, 1947 N.Y. Laws 466, cited in Pattishall, supra note
6, at 620 n.21 (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAWS § 368-d (McKinney 1984)).
14. The 1964 version ofthe Model Trademark Act anti-dilution statute provides as follows:
"Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark
registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law,
shall be ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services." MODEL STATE
TRADEmARKACT § 12 (1964), reprintedin J.Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAiR COMPETITION § 24:14 (3d ed. 1995).
15. See ALA. CODE §8-12-17 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §4-17-113 (Michie 1991); CAL.
Bus. &PROF. CODE §14330 (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-1 l(iXc) (West 1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, §3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §495.151 (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN.
§10-1-451(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1992); 765 ILCS 1035/15 (1995); IowA CODE
ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §51:223.1 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. it 10, §1530 (West 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110B, §12 (1992); MINN. STAT.
§325D.165 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §417.061(1) (Vernon's 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §3013-334 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. §87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §350-A:12 (1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §57-3-10 (Michie 1992); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §368-d (McKinney 1992);
OR.REV. STAT. §647.107 (1993); 54 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1124 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §6-2-12
(1992); S.C. CODEANN. §§39-15-1105(2) and 39-15-1165 (Law Co-op. 1994); TENN. CODE
ANN. §47-25-512 (1991); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §16.29 (West 1992); WASH. REV.
CODE §19.77 (1992); See also, Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"Expansion of Trademark
Rights: Is a FederalDilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIs. J.433, 439 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972)
(stating that without substantial similarity or likelihood of confusion, there was no right to relief
under the applicable dilution statute); King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd 454 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that some confusion must be
present for the dilution doctrine to take effect); See also Port, supra note 15, at 439; David S.
Welkowitz,Reexam iningTrademarkDilution,44 VAND. L. REV. 531,537 (1991) (stating that
"despite the broad brush of the statutes, courts initially were loathe to grant the protection the
laws purported to give').
17. See, e.g., Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.SA., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1029 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying plaintiff injunctive relief, at least in part because of the difficulty
listeners would have in distinguishing between "Lexis" and "Lexus"); Holiday Inns, Inc. v.
Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445,450 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the dilution doctrine
was not applicable because the marks themselves were not confusing); Haviland & Co. v.
Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928,956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that relief
under the New York anti-dilution statute required a showing of likelihood of confusion); See
Welkawitz, supranote 16, at 537.
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B. JudicialInterpretationof the Dilution Doctrine
Although there have been inconsistencies among courts with respect to some
aspects of dilution doctrine analysis, there are elements of a dilution cause of action
which are generally accepted and required by most courts. In general, courts
recognize dilution
in three forms: blurring, tarnishment, and dilution by
"genericization."' s Blurring involves Schechter's concept of the whittling away of a
mark's selling power, and is said to occur when defendant's use of an identical or
similar mark reduces the ability of the plaintiff's mark to identify the appropriate
goods. 9 Tarnishment results when plaintiff's mark is linked to shoddy products or
portrayed in an unsavory or unwholesome context such that the mark's reputation and
commercial value might be diminished."0 Dilution by "genericization" occurs when
a defendant's use threatens the uniqueness and distinctiveness of plaintiff's mark to
such an extent that the public may start to view plaintiff's mark as a generic term for
the product type.2

18. See Staffin, supranote 3, at 117. Staffin also suggests that a fourth type of dilution may
have been created by the Second Circuit's opinion in Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41
F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994) where the court enjoined defendant's use of a humorous and
disparaging alteration ofDeere &Co.'s stag deer silhouette mark in a television commercial,
reasoning that defendant's use, which was solely for the purpose of promoting defendant's
products, created a risk that consumers would attribute unfavorable characteristics to Deere &
Co.'s mark. Id. Staffin refers to this type of dilution as "dilution by humorous alteration of a
competitor's mark." Id.
19. See, e.g.,MeadDataCentral,875 F.2d at 1031 (finding little likelihood that blurring
would occur between plaintiffs "LEXIS" mark and Toyota's "LEXUS" mark, reasoning that
factors such as the limited scope of plaintiffs mark and consumer sophistication made it
unlikely that defendant's use would trigger the requisite mental association among plaintiffs
consumers necessary to give rise to blurring); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480,484-85 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the defendant's slogan, "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth," would blur Ringling
Bros.'s mark, "The Greatest Show on Earth," by lessening people's strong mental association
between Ringling Bros.'s mark and its circus).
20. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. D.B. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)
(enjoining a comedian's use of "Kodak" as a stage name, reasoning that the comedian's use of
humor containing sexual and violence themes would tarnish Eastman Kodak's mark, especially
in light of plaintiff's corporate policy of not associating its advertising with programs containing
excessive violence and sexual themes); Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F.Supp 836,
844 (D.Mass. 1964) (enjoining a restaurant's use of the famous jeweler's name, reasoning that
tamishment was likely due to the inferior quality of defendant's product and inferior nature of
defendant's advertising of the mark).
21. See Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding
that where plaintiff brought suit to enjoin defendant's use of the phrase, "the GENERIC
BRAND Version of Sykes' Perfect Nail," on its product, although the court found the facts
before it to be lacking, it indicated that dilution by genericization is established upon a showing
that: 1) the mark was a strong, well recognized mark, 2) defendant used the mark to identify
its own product, and 3) defendant's use is likely to turn "Sykes' Perfect Nail" into a generic
term); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (1968) (reversing a lower court holding that
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The basic foundation for most courts' analyses is a requirement that the mark be
distinctive or well-recognized and that the defendant's use be capable of, or likely to,
dilute that distinctiveness.2" Distinctiveness is often defined by courts as uniqueness,
or as the trait a mark attains once it has acquired secondary meaning.' Some courts
have even
equated distinctiveness with strength of a mark as used in infringement
24
analysis.
Although most courts seem to agree that distinctiveness is a requirement, there is
disagreement over how distinctive a mark must be in order to warrant protection under
the dilution doctrine. For instance, courts in the Second Circuit have relied heavily
upon the strength of the mark analysis, requiring marks to meet a relatively high
threshold in order to be deemed distinctive.' The Seventh Circuit, however, has
applied an arguably lower threshold, taking into account a broad range of factors in

defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiff's mark made the mark generic; the court determined
that the defendant did not use plaintiff's mark as a generic term, because defendant used the
mark only to identify plaintiff's product, not to identify their own as if it had come to be a
common name for the product).
22. Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153, 1157 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring the
plaintiff to show that "the mark is distinctive and that the subsequent user's use dilutes that

distinctiveness"). Similarly, a leading case in the Ninth Circuit states that the dilution doctrine
protects "strong, well recognized marks... if defendant's use is such as to tarnish, degrade or
dilute the distinctive quality of the mark." Toho Company, Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645
F.2d 788,793 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 2 J. T. McCarthy, Trademarks & Unfair Competition
§ 24.13, at 155 (1973)) In the Second Circuit, a leading case states that one of two
requirements for a finding of dilution is that plaintiff's mark "possess a distinctive quality
capable of dilution." MeadDataCentral,875 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Allied Maintenance Corp.
v. Allied Mechanical Trade, Inc., 369 N.E. 2d 1162, 1166 (N.Y. 1977)).
23. See Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162,
1166 (N.Y. 1977Xciting Skil Corp. v. Bamet, 150 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1958)); Mann v.
Parkway Motor Sales, 85 N.E.2d 210 (Mass. 1949)); See also Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan,
Inc., 699 F.2d 621,625 (2d. Cir. 1983).
24. See P.F.Cosmetique, SAv. Minnetonka, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 662, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(stating that distinctiveness for dilution purposes can be evaluated in much the same way as
"strength of mark" in a likelihood of confusion analysis);AlliedMaintenance,369 N.E.2d at
1166 (holding that for a plaintiff to show that its mark is distinct, it must show that it first
possesses a strong mark, defined as being distinct, arbitrary, or coined, rather than a weak mark,
which is generic or descriptive).
25. See Allied Maintenance, 369 N.E.2d at 1166 ( rejecting plaintiffs dilution claim
because its mark lacked sufficient distinctiveness, stating that only those marks that are truly of
distinctive quality or have a secondary meaning among the public deserve protection). The
dissenting judge inAllied Maintenancecriticized the majority's standard for distinctiveness as
setting too high of a threshold and warned that it might be read as to grant only the most wellknown marks, such as Tiffany, relief from dilution. Id. at 1168 (Cooke, J., dissenting). See also
Hester Industries, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1275, 1278 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)
(applying the law ofthe Second Circuit to interpret New York's anti-dilution statute, the district
court stated that plaintiffs mark must be extremely strong).
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determining distinctiveness."
An issue which has caused much inconsistency among courts has been whether
consumer confusion is a necessary element of a dilution claim, or as the state statutes
suggest, is totally irrelevant. Most of the courts addressing this issue have applied
state dilution statutes that have expressly provided for relief to be granted to a
trademark holder irrespective of confusion as to source or goods.27 Nonetheless, for
years courts have either refused
to apply, or have misunderstood, the plain language
28
of these state dilution statutes.
Most commentators agree that the 1977 New York Court of Appeals decision in
Allied Maintenance Corp. v. AlliedMechanicalTrades, Inc."z represents a significant

turning point in judicial interpretations of state dilution statutes.30 The court in Allied
Maintenanceacknowledged that courts generally failed to follow the express language
of dilution statutes and stated that neither consumer confusion nor competition
between the products involved was required by the statute.3' Although this assertion
by the New York Court of Appeals was merely dictum, some courts thereafter began
to accept, or at least to some extent purport to accept, the idea that likelihood of
confusion was not an element in a dilution cause of action.32

26. See Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480,482-83 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that "The Greatest Show on
Earth" 'as distinctive, taking into account the length of time the mark had been used, the scope
of advertising, the nature and extent of plaintiffs business and the scope of plaintiffs reputation;
court rejected defendant's argument that the mark was not distinctive because it consisted of
common words that were not coined); Hyatt Corp., 736 F.2d at 1158 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that even though "Hyatt" is a personal name and the lower court had found this mark to be
"reasonably common" the appellate court found the mark to be distinctive after considering the
length of plaintiffs use and the amount of advertising).
27. See supra notes 14 and 15. See also B.J. Meadows IMI,
TrademarkDilution: Its
Development,Japan'sExperience, and the New USTA FederalProposal,22 GEo. WASH. J.
INT'L. L. &EcoN. 417,425 (1988).

28. See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705,709 (7th Cir. 1972)
(equating substantial similarity with likelihood of confusion and rejected a dilution claim on the
basis of there being neither, even though the statute made confusion irrelevant); King Research,
Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631,639 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd 454 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1972)
(requiring a showing of confusion even though the applicable statute stated confusion was
irrelevant); See also Howard J. Shire, Dilution Versus Deception - Are State Antidilution
Laws an ApproprateAltemative to the Law oflnfringement?, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 273,283

(1987).
29. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (1977).
30. See Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for
Trademark-TradeIdentity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 292 (1984). See also
Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"Expansion of TrademarkRights: Is a FederalDilution
Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 433, 440 (1994); David S. Welkowitz,
Reexamining TrademarkDilution,44 VAND. L.RFv. 531,537 (1991).
31. AlliedMaintenance,369 N.E.2d at 1165-66.

32. See, e.g., Hyatt Corp., 763 F.2d at 1157 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319
F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963); Edgewater Beach Apartments Corp. v. Edgewater Beach
ManagementCo., 299 N.E.2d 548,554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)) (holding that neither competition
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Recent case law reveals, however, that even courts that claim to follow the express
language of the applicable dilution statute, providing that confusion is irrelevant to a
finding of dilution, may still allow consideration of confusion into their analysis. 3
Such courts look at consumer confusion to determine whether the marks are
sufficiently similar to warrant dilution relief.34 The reason, therefore, that courts now
deem consumer confusion to be relevant to a dilution analysis is that the doctrine has
been expanded. Originally, dilution was seen as a remedy for the unauthorized use of
a mark that was identical to the established mark; but today the doctrine also applies
to the unauthorized use of a mark that is merely similar to the established mark.35
Another concept that has been troublesome for courts in applying the dilution
doctrine is that of limiting the doctrine to commercial uses only. As the First Circuit
explained in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.," the notion that only

commercial diluting uses should be enjoined finds its roots in the First Amendment.
InL.L Bean, the Court held that defendant's sexually explicit parody of L.L. Bean's
catalog and products was a noncommercial use of plaintiff's trademark and was a
protected form of speech.37 The Court explained that the dilution doctrine can place
limits on commercial speech because the Constitution tolerates "an incidental impact
on rights of expression of commercial actors in order to prevent a defendant from
unauthorizedly merchandising his products with another's trademark."3"
Unfortunately, many courts have found it very difficult to determine whether speech
is commercial or noncommercial, especially with respect to speech possessing both

between users nor confusion need be shown); Sally Gee, 699 F.2d at 624 (citing to Allied
Maintenanceto support its proposition that confusion and competition are not elements of a
dilution claim); See Pattishall, supra note 30, at 294-297; Shire, supra note 28, at 286-287.
33. See, e.g., Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,

1029-30 (2d Cir. 1989) (analyzing whether a consumer would confuse the "Lexis" mark with
the "Lexus" mark, by determing whether the marks were substantially similar); Hester
Industries, Inc, v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1275, 1279-80 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)
(determining whether "WING-FLINGS" diluted plaintiff's "WING-DINGS" mark, the court
examined factors similar to those used in a likelihood of confusion analysis).
34. See supra note 33.
35. MeadDataCentral,875 F2d at 1028-29 (citing Community Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (quoting Pro-phy-lac-tic Brush Co. v.

Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F.2d 549, 553 (1st Cir. 1948)); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of
Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Frank . Schechter, The RationalBasis of
Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. RnV. 813, 830-33 (1927); Shire, Dilution Versus
Deception - Are State Antidilution Laws an Appropriate Alternative to the Law of
Infingement?, 77 TRADEMARKREP. 273-76 (1987); 2 J. McCarthy, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAm

ComPEImON §24:13 at 215 (2d ed. 1984)) (explaining how the dilution doctrine has evolved
to the point where similarity of marks is relevant, and explained that this evolution has occurred
because it was perceived that the unauthorized use of a mark very similar to the original could
have the same diluting effect as the unauthorized use of the actual original mark).
36. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishing, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1 st Cir. 1987), cert. denied483
U.S. 1013 (1987).
37. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 30-31.
38. Id. at32.
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commercial and noncommercial attributes.3 9
Proponents of the dilution doctrine have pushed for a federal dilution statute for
years. Many of the problems discussed above, such as the lack of uniformity provided
by state statutes, extraterritoriality of the relief and concerns over the possible
preemption of state statutes by the Lanham Act, have provided a major impetus for
those seeking federal legislation." Those proponents of a federal dilution statute
almost got the law they wanted in 1988, when a federal cause of action for dilution was
proposed to Congress as part of the Trademark Revision Act.4 The dilution section,
however, was ultimately dropped from the final bill; apparently due, in large part, to
First Amendment concerns raised by media and advertising groups. 2
Then, in March of 1995, Representative Carlos Moorhead (R. Calif.) introduced a
federal dilution bill before the House of Representatives that was very similar to the
1988 dilution bill.43 This time, however, the bill contained a provision addressing
First Amendment concerns.4 Congress passed the bill in December of 1995. The
provisions of this bill, presently enacted and known as the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995, will now be examined more closely.
C. Overview of the FederalTrademarkDilutionAct of 1995

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (the "1995 Act" or the "Act") amends4
the Lanham Act by adding a new subsection to § 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946. 1
Section 43 supplements other provisions of the Lanham-Act by providing a cause of
action for persons whose marks are not federally registered -- granting them relief
against persons making false representations and against other types of unfair

39. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)
(recognizing the difficulty of making bright line distinctions between commercial and
noncommercial speech for purposes of applying a city ordinance; the court suggested a broader
and more nuanced approach); San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S.
541 (1987) (holding that an expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, use of plaintiffs
trademark did not shield defendant from a trademark infringement claim); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that mailings were commercial speech, the
court examined the application of a statute prohibiting mailing of unsolicited advertisements to
defendant's informational pamphlets and ads promoting his contraceptive products).
40. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 146-54 (discussing recent initiatives to enact a federal
dilution statute).
41. See Trademark Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3985 (1988);
H.R. REP.No. 100-1028, 100th Cong. (1988).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 1028, 100th Cong. (1988). A statement by the U.S. Trademark
Association had acknowledged the possibility that this proposal could raise First Amendment
concerns, but had asserted that its provisions were necessary to provide relief for the real injuries
of tarnishment and disparagement of marks. Statement of the United States Trademark
Association In Support of§ 1883 (DeConcini) The Trademark Law Revision Act, reprintedin
78 TRADEMARK REP. 382,404 (1988).
43. See 141 CONG. REc. -13572 (daily ed. March 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
44. H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1995).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1984).
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competition.46 The 1995 Act grants injunctive relief to the owner of a famous mark
where another's commercial use of a mark dilutes the distinctive quality of the famous
mark.47 The Act then lists eight factors that a court may consider to determine whether
48
a mark is "distinctive and famous.

The Act goes on to offer a plaintiff in a federal dilution suit remedies not before
available. Under almost all of the state dilution statutes, a plaintiff is only entitled to
injunctive relief.49 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, however, makes it
possible for a plaintiff to obtain monetary relief where the defendant "willfully
intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark."5
Neither the language of the Act nor the legislative history to the Act define the term
"willfully intended."
The Act also addresses First Amendment issues, under the new subsection (c)(4)
of § 43. The subsection exempts fair use of a mark in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion, noncommercial use of a mark, and forms of news reporting
and commentary.5' The Congressional Record to the 1995 Act reveals that speakers
before Congress made much of the fact that a provision in the 1995 Act should address
First Amendment concerns. 2 The question remains, however, whether this new
federal statute gives courts an adequate framework through which to effectively deal
with these First Amendment concerns -- a topic that is addressed in the analysis below.
46. See Joseph P. Bauer, A FederalLaw of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the
Reach ofSection 43(a) ofthe Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671,704 (1984).

47. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985
(1996).
48. Supra note 47. The new subsection (c)(1) will provide, in pertinent part:
"In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as,
but not limited to(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods and services
with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree ofrecognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by
the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February
20, 1905, or on the principal register."
49. See supra note 15 (for citations to the state dilution statutes). The South Carolina
dilution statute, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-15-1105(2) and 39-15-1165 (1994), which was enacted
in 1994, provides that monetary relief may be granted for willful dilution, using language very
similar to that used in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. See 141 CONG. Rc. S19310 (daily ed. December 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
141 CONG. REc. S19312 (daily ed. December 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); 141 CONG.

Rtc. H14317 (daily ed. December 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
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Furthermore, the Act amends § 45 ofthe Trademark Act of 1946"3 with a definition
of dilution. The definition provides that "'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of- (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 5 4 The Act became
immediately effective on its enactment date of January 16, 1996.
As this overview demonstrates, many pertinent issues are addressed by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. Of course, the true impact of the Act will depend
upon judicial interpretation and application. The analysis below will address those
interpretation and application issues that promise to be the most troublesome for
courts, based on ambiguity in the Act and past application of state dilution statutes.
First, the application of the Act's commercial-noncommercial speech dichotomy to
quasi-commercial speech will be examined. Then, concerns that the Act will be
redundant with respect to federal trademark infringement law will be addressed and
analyzed. Finally, the analysis ofthe redundancy issue will include discussion of other
relevant issues, such as the expansion of the dilution doctrine to include consideration
of consumer confusion and the expansion of trademark infringement.
II. ANALYsIs
A. FirstAmendment Concerns in the Context of Quasi-CommercialSpeech

As has been stated by certain proponents of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, provisions of the Act do address First Amendment concerns.55 The issue
remains, however, as to whether application of these provisions, especially in the
context of quasi-commercial speech, will violate the First Amendment. In addressing
this issue, the discussion below will begin with an explanation of what is meant by the
term "quasi-commercial" speech, followed by a facial application of the 1995 Act to
such speech. It will then provide an overview and analysis of the case law dealing
with First Amendment concerns in the context of quasi-commercial speech. Finally,
it will examine whether the applicable provisions of the new federal Act are likely to
offend the First Amendment in the context of quasi-commercial speech.
At least for the purposes of this article, "quasi-commercial" speech refers simply
to that speech which appears to have attributes of both commercial and
noncommercial speech. Some commentators have referred to this type of speech as
"mixed" speech or "hybrid" speech.5" For the purposes of the dilution doctrine, such
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 1996).
54. Supra note 47.
55. See supra'note52.
56. Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards a Reconciliationwith the Lanham
Act, 6 FoRDHAM INTELL. PRop. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 169 (1995) (referring to speech
involving commercial and noncommercial aspects as "mixed speech"); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65
NOTRE DAM& L. RaV. 397, 401 (1990) (referring to trademark usages that fall along the
spectrum between serving a signaling function and an expressive function as hybrid usages of
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speech usually takes the form of a parody, a satire or a social-political commentary,

which incorporates the principal user's famous mark and is placed on goods in
commerce." However, virtually any type of commercial speech to which First
Amendment protection is significantly applicable can be thought of as quasicommercial speech. This is because any such hybridization of commercial and
noncommercial aspects of speech makes it difficult to discern how such speech fits
into the 1995 Act's commercial-noncommercial speech dichotomy.58 A closer
examination of the categories of speech expressly exempted under subsection (c)(4)
of the 1995 Act reveals the difficulty one faces in trying to determine if many forms
of quasi-commercial speech are actionable under the Act.59 For instance, parody,
satire and social/political commentary clearly do not constitute the "comparative
commercial advertising" referred to under subsection (c)(4).' This is because their
primary purpose is to parody, or to make a social or political commentary on, a
plaintiff's mark, rather than to provide consumers with a comparison of the attributes
of competing goods. Likewise, much commercial speech serving an important
governmental interest would not constitute comparative commercial advertising."

trademarks).
57. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769,776-78 (8th Cir. 1994)
(looking to both the commercial and noncommercial aspects of defendant's speech, the court
rejected defendant's First Amendment defense where defendant had placed an ad parody
containing plaintiff s famous "Michelob" mark; the court stated that placement of the parody
on the back cover of the magazine made its editorial purpose non-evident to consumers); Cliffs

Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1159, 1164
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting a First Amendment defense to an infringement claim where
defendant published a parody using plaintiffs "Cliffs Notes" mark, the court noted that
defendant's use was on the cover of the publication and was for both commercial and
noncommercial purposes); L.L. Bean, Inc. V. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26,32-34 (1st
Cir. 1987) (court accepted defendant's First Amendment defense to a dilution claim after

examining the commercial and noncommercial aspects of an magazine's sexually explicit
parody utilizing plaintiffs mark).
58. The Act creates this commercial-noncommercial speech dichotomy by first stating
simply that the Act applies to the commercial use of a mark and then going on to list exemptions
from the Act's coverage for certain noncommercial uses. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (cX4) (Supp. 1996) Subsection (cX4) provides: The following shall
not be actionable under this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services
of the owner of the famous mark; (B) Noncommercial use of a mark; (C) All forms of new
reporting and news commentary.
60. Supra note 59.
61. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557 (1980) (stating that simple promotional advertising by a utility company had some
informational value and was entitled to First Amendment protection, notwithstanding the fact
that the state's legitimate interest in energy conservation outweighed the First Amendment
interest; no comparative advertising was involved); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (acknowledging that defendants' use
ofthe work"Olympic" in promoting its sporting events was entitled to some First Amendment
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Quasi-commercial speech also cannot properly be categorized as a "noncommercial
use of a mark' or as strictly "news reporting or commentary,"63 because by definition
it has a significant commercial aspect.
By the same token, it would seem inappropriate to categorize such speech as a
commercial use of a mark and deny it any exemption under the Act, because the
Supreme Court has held that commercial speech is protected from government
regulation by the First Amendment in certain situations.' Limited First Amendment
protection was extended to commercial speech in VirginiaState Bd. ofPharmacyv.
VirginiaCitizens ConsumerCouncil, Inc.6" Then, in CentralHudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Supreme Court created a test to determine

whether a regulation of commercial speech passes First Amendment muster.' The
CentralHudson test first requires that the commercial speech at issue concern a
lawful activity and not be misleading in order for the speech to be deserving of any
First Amendment protection.' If these requirements are satisfied, the court then
scrutinizes the government's interest in regulating the speech by asking whether the
government's interest is substantial and, if so, whether the regulation directly advances
that interest and whether such regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest."

protection; "Olympic" was not used in the comparative advertising sense where another's mark
is used to identify a competitor's goods for the purpose of comparing competitive attributes).
62. Supra note 59.
63. Supra note 59.
64. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748,771-72 (1976).
65. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); See Maria I. Kaplan,Antidiluton Statutes and the First
Amendment, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1139, 1161-62 (1992).
66. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (upholding a utility company's First Amendment right to
engage inpromotional advertising, even though this conflicted with the state's legitimate interest
inenergy conservation, because the informational value of the advertising was not outweighed
by the legitimate governmental interest).
67. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Because misleading speech is not entitled to First
Amendment protection, First Amendment concerns are not an issue with respect to trademark
infringement claims - a use that causes a likelihood of confusion would likely be deemed
misleading. See Staffin, supra note 3, at 167. Likewise, because likelihood of confusion is
supposedly irrelevant to a dilution claim there is not built-in mechanism to guard against First
Amendment violations.
An interesting issue arises, however, where courts require a showing of consumer confusion
in order to establish that two marks are sufficiently similar to support a dilution claim, as is
discussed with respect to the redundancy issue. Perhaps one could extend this reasoning to
argue in certain situations that a use that tarnishes a mark causes either consumer confusion
with respect to the marks or with respect to sponsorship such that the use does not warrant First
Amendment protection.
68. Id. See also San FranciscoArts &Athletics, 483 U.S. at 540 (defendants claimed a
politically expressive purpose in using the phrase "Gay Olympic Games" in promotional

materials, in violation of a federal statute granting plaintiffs exclusive right to use the word
"Olympic;" the Court held that Congress had a legitimate interest in granting this right and that
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The case law dealing with First Amendment defenses invoked to defend quasicommercial speech against dilution claims and other government regulation
demonstrates that such speech neither consistently fails nor consistently succeeds in
receiving First Amendment protection. 9 In San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc. v.
UnitedStates Olympic Committee ("Gay Olympics") the U.S. Supreme Court held

that the First Amendment did not prohibit Congress from granting the United States
Olympic Committee (the "USOC") the exclusive use of the word "Olympic."7 The
San Fransisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (the "SFAA"), the junior user of the "Olympic"
name, claimed that its use of "Olympic" on its promotional materials was intended to
make a political statement about the status of homosexuals in society. 7' The Court
held, however, that the SFAA's use of "Olympic" was commercial speech, and that
application of the Act granting the USOC exclusive use of the name did not violate the
First Amendment because the Act was not broader than necessary to protect Congress'
legitimate interest.72
In contrast, the Supreme Court held, in VirginiaState Boardof Pharmacy,that a

statute declaring it to be unprofessional conduct for pharmacists to advertise the prices
of prescription drugs violated the First Amendment.73 The Court held that the state's
interests in maintaining a high degree of professionalism among pharmacists and
protecting consumer health were not substantial enough to outweigh the limited First
Amendment protection accorded commercial speech.74 In addition, the Court
determined that there were competing policy interests to be served by allowing the

the Act was no broader than necessary to protect that legitimate interest).
69. See, e.g., San FransiscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. 522 (1983) First Amendment

claim failed to stop the Olympic Committee from enjoining the defendant's use of the name,
"Gay Olympic Games"; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 903 (1995) (rejecting defendant's First Amendment defense

where defendant had published an ad parody using Plaintiff's "Michelob" mark); L.L. Bean,
Inc. V. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (accepting defendant's First
Amendment defense for using plaintiff's mark in a sexually explicit parody); Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (accepting
pharmacists' claims that a state's ban on advertising prescription drug prices violated the First
Amendment).
70. San FranciscoArts&Athletics, 483 U.S. at 540.
71. Id. at 535. SFAA contended that "Olympic" best described its activities "because it
embodied the concepts of 'peace, friendship and positive social interaction."' Id. (quoting App.
99).

72. Id. at 537. The Court stated that Congress' exclusive grant of the word "Olympic"
served the following interest of providing the USOC with an incentive to produce a quality
product that would, in turn, benefit the public by benefitting young people and by fostering
peace and goodwill internationally.
73. Virginia State BoardofPharmacy,425 U.S. at 773.
74. Id. at 765-68. The state argued that price advertising would deteriorate the strong
relationships between many pharmacists and their customers, cause pharmacists to offer fewer
services, cause some drugs to remain on the shelf longer than they should, and would reduce
the pharmacists status from that of a professional to that of a mere retailer. Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/4

14

Bowen: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995--Does It Address the D

1996]

TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

89

price advertising.75
As the discussion of the following cases demonstrates, there are some particular
factors that are relevant only to a First Amendment analysis in the context of parodies,
satires or social commentary. In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishing,Inc., the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the application of Maine's anti-dilution statute to
a magazine's sexually explicit parody of the L.L. Bean trademark and merchandise
violated the First Amendment' 6 The court in L.L. Bean listed the following attributes
of the parody in support of its determination that the speech was noncommercial: the
table of contents labelled the article as "humor" and "parody"; the article constituted
a small part of the entire magazine (two pages in a one-hundred-page magazine);
neither the parody nor plaintiff's mark appeared on the front or back cover of the
magazine; defendant did not use the mark to promote the sale of goods or services; and
defendant did not intend to market the goods displayed in the parody.77 The court
distinguished this case from cases that "might appear at first glance to be factually
analogous" on the basis that those cases all involved commercial uses of trademarks
and none
dealt with the use of plaintiff's mark as a vehicle for editorial or artistic
78
parody.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals later held that the First Amendment
did not protect the publication of a parody of the "Michelob" mark on the back cover
of a humor magazine from dilution and infringement claims. 79 In Anheuser-Busch,
defendant had published a mock advertisement for a fictitious product called
"Michelob Oily." The mock advertisement was allegedly intended to comment on
such social concerns as a then-recent oil spill in a river serving as a source of water
for Anheuser-Busch and the proliferation of Anheuser-Busch beer brands and
advertisements.' The court distinguished the holding in L.L. Bean based on the fact
that the L.L. Bean parody had made no derogatory comment about the quality of
plaintiff's products and the fact that the L.L. Bean parody was located inside a 100-

75. Id. at 763-66. The court determined that allowing price advertising would serve the
policy interests of providing consumers with a free flow of information and providing lower
prices for the most economically disadvantaged prescription drug purchasers..
76. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34.
77. Id. at 32-33. In light of the listed factors, the court determined that this was
noncommercial speech used in an editorial or artistic context, rather than speech related solely
to economic interests.
78. Id. at 32. Of the cases cited by the court as being distinguishable, none involved the use
ofa trademark ina magazine or other written publication. Id. at 31-32. However, the court did
cite DallasCowboys Cheerleadersv. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979),
which involved the unauthorized use of a mark in a pornographic film, as being distinguishable.
Id. at 31. The court's parenthetical explanation of DallasCowboys, however, suggests that the
use of the trademark in the promotion of the film made the case distinguishable, because the
court's parenthetical described the use as "an unauthorized use in content and promotion."
79. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769,778 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied 115 S.Ct. 903 (1995).
80. Id. at 772.
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page magazine."
In a slightly different context, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Mutual
of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak; that a defendant's sale of t-shirts and other
merchandise containing a parody of the Mutual of Omaha "Indian head" logo was not
protected by the First Amendment.' The court essentially stated that plaintiff's
trademark was a form of property, and that plaintiff's rights in that property were not
outweighed by First Amendment concerns.' The court stated that there were
alternative means for defendant to express his view, such as through an editorial
parody in a book, magazine or film.84
The analysis in many of the above cases suggests that courts essentially employ a
balancing-of-factors approach. A few courts, however, have explicitly stated that a
balancing approach is appropriate in situations where the distinction between
unprotected speech and protected speech is difficult to draw. 5 In Cliff's Notes, Inc.
v. BantamDoubledayDell PublishingGroup,Inc., the court stated that "the general
proscription against use of another's trademark in commercial endeavors must be
balanced with the need for free expression."' Later in Anheuser-Busch, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly followed Cliff's Notes in applying a balancing test
to hold that the "Michelob Oily" ad parody was not protected by the First
Amendment."
This overview of the applicable case law demonstrates that quasi-commercial
speech does not consistently fall on either the protected or unprotected side of a First
Amendment analysis. This is because, as this overview also demonstrates, courts
consider a variety of factors in determining whether First Amendment protections
apply. For instance, courts examine whether the regulation is necessary to effectuate

81. Id. at 778. The court inAnheuser-Buschpointed out that surveys had demonstrated that
the parody led people to believe that Anheuser-Busch products were contaminated, adding that
the parody's unsupported attack was not necessary to the defendants goal of commenting on
the then-recent oil spill or pollution in general. The court also stated that, unlike in L.L. Bean
where the parody had been buried in the magazine, the parody here was on the back cover with
only a tiny disclosure, such that a casual viewer might not appreciate the editorial purpose.
82. Mutual ofOmaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied

488 U.S. 933 (1988).
83. Id. at 402. The court, however, upheld the lower court's imposition of an injunction
only to the extent that defendant used the mark 'to market, advertise, or identify [his] services
or products."' (quoting the Designated Record (D.R.) at 76-77).
84. Id. (stating that since other avenues of expression were open to Novak, neither the
public nor Novak was deprived of the benefits of his ideas).
85. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir.
1994), cert denied 115 S.Ct. 903 (1995) (citing Clifs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494); Cliffs Notes,
Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
86. Cliff's Notes, 718 F. Supp. at 1162 (holding that the First Amendment did not protect
defendant's "Spy Notes," which incorporated much of plaintiff's "Cliffs Notes" design and
layout on its publications parodying popular novels, from a trademark infringement claim).
87. Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 776 (citing Cliff's Notes, 886 F.2d at 494).
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the government's legitimate interests,88 whether a person exerting free speech rights
could express his or her ideas through alternative means,"9 and the amount of harm
caused to the plaintiff by the speech.' ° In short, a determination that speech is
commercial or noncommercial is relevant, but certainly not dispositive, as to whether
First Amendment protections apply.
At least a couple of different conclusions might be drawn from the foregoing
discussion of precedent in this area of law. One might conclude, for instance, that the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 is fundamentally flawed, directing courts in
certain situations to apply the dilution doctrine in such a way as to violate the First
Amendment. One might also conclude, however, that the 1995 Act merely allows
leeway for courts to make the fine distinctions sometimes necessary in a First
Amendment analysis.
One commentator, addressing First Amendment issues in the context of the right
of publicity, has concluded that courts should be allowed some flexibility in making
determinations as to whether or not speech is primarily commercial." Such an
approach is advantageous because it allows courts to balance the relevant competing
interests and concerns.92 This argument applies equally to First Amendment analysis
of quasi-commercial speech in the context of the dilution doctrine, because the
applicable case law provides that there are many competing factors to be considered.
Even though the applicable provisions of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 may facially appear to create a rigid categorical approach, the commercialnoncommercial speech dichotomy could be applied quite flexibly. For instance, in an
attempt to categorize speech, courts may end up weighing the commercial aspects of
speech against its noncommercial aspects, which in effect might resemble a balancing
approach. Courts might even go so far as to create a legal fiction that a strong
governmental interest in regulating speech makes that speech more commercial in
nature.
Nonetheless, there are certain basic aspects of a First Amendment analysis that the
1995 Act could have incorporated that would have helped the Act to stay within
constitutional boundaries without unduly limiting court flexibility. For instance, the
Act could have provided that the following factors weigh in favor of a determination
that speech is noncommercial: 1) that there are no means of expression less offensive
to the dilution doctrine; 2) that the noncommercial purpose of the speech is apparent
to the casual viewer or listener; and 3) that the interest in giving and receiving the
information and/or opinions outweighs any government interest in regulating the
speech. Such a provision would help ensure that courts do not offend the Constitution
88. See, e.g., San FranciscoArts &Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S.
at 536-37.
89. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. V. Novak, 836 F.2d at 402.
90. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 777-78.
91. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right ofPublicity vs. The FirstAmendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 107-08 (1994) (arguing that courts should be
allowed some degree of discretion in determining whether speech is primarily commercial; and
contending that a rule that would cover all potential uses is inconceivable).
92. See Kwall, supra note 91, at 113-14.
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in trying to properly apply the 1995 Act The short, ambiguous provisions of the 1995
Act make it speculative, at best, as to whether courts will incorporate relevant First
Amendment principles into their analyses.
B. Redundancy: The Issue of Whether Dilution and Infringement Overlap
One of the most common criticisms leveled at the dilution doctrine is that it
provides relief in areas already covered by trademark infringement.93 This criticism
takes two basic forms. First, if a trademark owner can obtain the necessary protection
for his or her mark in most situations through an infringement claim, the dilution
doctrine is simply not needed, and is a waste of time and resources.94 This line of
criticism strikes at the heart of one of the principal justifications for even having a
dilution cause of action: that dilution picks up where trademark infringement analysis
leaves off 95 Second, to the extent that dilution and infringement overlap, this causes
confusion with respect to the application of the dilution doctrine and threatens to
create confusion with respect to the application of the infringement doctrine.
The discussion below will examine the issue of whether the dilution doctrine is
indeed, to an unacceptable extent, redundant Two basic arguments will be addressed:
1) that consideration of consumer confusion in a dilution claim causes redundancy and
2) that there is redundancy by virtue of the expansion of the infringement doctrine.
The significance of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 in the context of these
arguments will also be examined where appropriate.
1. Redundancy By Virtue of Courts' Considerationof ConsumerConfusion
All of the state dilution statutes, as well as the new federal act, provide that either
"confusion as to source or goods," or "likelihood of confusion," is irrelevant to a
dilution cause of action.96 This language with respect to confusion is very much in

93. See David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining TrademarkDilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531,
548-50 (1991) (arguing that the dilution doctrine is not needed because in most cases the
Lanham Act applies); See also, Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards a
Reconciliation with the LanhamAct, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &ENT. L.J. 105, 16264 (1995) (discussing criticisms that the dilution doctrine is redundant).
94. See Staffin, supra note 93, at 162 (stating that the most potent criticism of dilution is
that it is unnecessary); Welkowitz, supranote 93, at 548 (states that the problem with dilution

claims for competing uses can be summed up in the question, "Why bother?').
95. See Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 856 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting
2 J. McCarthy, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAm COMPETITON, Sect. 24:13, at 213 (2d. ed. 1984);
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON TRADemArKS AD UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:13(lXb)
(3d ed. 1995).

96. See supranote 15 (listing citations to the state dilution statutes; The federal act and the
statutes ofMinnesota, South Carolina and Washington follow the language of the 1992 version

of the state Model Bill of the United States Trademark Association, now the International
TrademarkAssociation, which reads, in relevant part, as follows: "The term 'dilution' as used
herein means the lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of(a) competition between the parties, or (b)
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keeping with Schechter's original conception of dilution as a means of protecting
trademarks in situations beyond those where confusion results from the misuse of a
mark and conventional relief is available.97 If one takes Schechter's concept and the
language of the dilution statutes at face value there seems to be no overlap between
infringement and dilution: one addresses the problem of uses that are likely to cause
confusion and the other addresses the whittling away of selling power, regardless of
confusion. As was discussed in the overview, many courts have held that consumer
confusion is relevant to a dilution analysis for the purpose of determining if the marks
at issue are sufficiently similar to support a dilution claim.9
The argument that consumer confusion should be considered in a dilution claim
intuitively makes sense, because as Professor McCarthy explains in his book,
McCarthy on Trademarks and UnfairCompetition, there can be no dilution unless

a reasonable buyer is likely to make a mental association between the two marks at
issue." In fact, one court has gone so far as to state that any dilution that might flow
from two coexisting uses, that caused no significant confusion, would be insubstantial
and not warrant relief."® The problem is that once the dilution doctrine was expanded
to apply to the use of a mark very similar to the senior user's mark, rather than just to
the use of the identical mark, courts began to analyze whether the marks at issue were
sufficiently similar to support a dilution claim.' The analysis many courts now use
to determine whether there exists sufficient similarity between two marks resembles,
to some extent, the analysis for determining likelihood of confusion in an infringement
analysis."2

likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception." See McCarthy, supra note 14, § 24.14(3)

(reprinted text of the 1992 Model Bill) (emphasis added). The remainder of the state statutes
substantially used the "confusion" language of the 1964 version of the Model Bill, which
provides inrelevant part "Dilution ...
shall be ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding...the
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services." See McCarthy, supra note 14, §
24.14(2) (reprinting the text of the 1964 Model Bill).
97. Schechter, supra note 6, at 824-5.
98. See MeadData Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.SA., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1028-30
(analyzing the likelihood that a reasonable person would confuse "Lexis" with "Lexus" in
spoken version, to determine if the marks were similar); Hester Industries, Inc. V. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1281 (stating that product similarity increases likelihood of confusion,
which in turn increases similarity of the marks); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada,
525 F. Supp. at 1124 (stating that there could not be dilution without confusion, which court
equated with similarity of marks).
99. McCarthy, supranote 14, § 24:13.
100. Dreyfus Fund,525 F. Supp. at 1023-24.
101. See Mead DataCentral,875 F.2d at 1028-29 (explaining why marks must be similar
and why confusion is relevant to that determination).
102. Most courts analyze the following list ofPolaroidfactors to determine if there is a
likelihood of confusion for the purposes of an infringement analysis:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the two marks;
(3) the competitive proximity of the products or services;
(4) the existence of actual confusion;
(5) the likelihood that the plaintiff will "bridge the gap" between the two markets,
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The argument has been made, however, that the confusion required for a dilution
claim is different from the confusion at which infringement is aimed, and therefore,
At least one court has contended that dilution
there is no significant overlap.'
requires merely confusion as to the marks themselves, while infringement is concerned
with confusion as to source or goods, which suggests there is no overlap.'" This
argument has some merit, at least with respect to noncompeting uses of marks. For
instance, even though consumers might confuse "Lexus" (mark for cars) with "Lexis"
(mark for computer research products), the reasonable consumer would not likely
become confused as to source or goods by concluding that Toyota had ventured into
the computer research business or that there was some connection between Lexus cars
and Lexis computer research products.' In such a situation a consumer would not
mistakenly buy one product when intending to buy another. Furthermore, because it
would seem highly improbable that a marketer would intentionally tie these unrelated
goods together with a common trademark, most consumers would not conclude that
the senior mark holder sponsored, was connected with, or affiliated with these
(6) the defendant's good faith in adopting its mark;
(7) the quality of the defendant's product; and
(8) the sophistication of the purchasers.
PolaroidCorp.v.PolaradElectronicsCorp., 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,

368 U.S. 820 (1961).
Compare thesePolaroidfactors with factors sometimes used to determine whether there has
Ibeen blurring of a mark sufficient to constitute dilution. Once it is determined that plaintiffs
mark is distinctive, or a strong mark, courts may analyze the following factors:
(1) similarity of the marks;
(2) similarity of the products covered by the marks;
(3) sophistication of consumers;
(4) predatory intent
(5) renown of the senior mark;
(6) renown of the junior mark.
MeadDataCentral,875 F.2d at 1035 (Sweet, I., concurring opinion); See HesterIndustries,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1280. Each of these factors, except perhaps for renown of the junior and
senior marks, correspond with a Polaroidfactor. Most courts addressing the blurring issue
examine at least some of these factors, and many times their factual analysis may closely
resemble alikelihood of confusion factual analysis. See, e.g.,Mead DataCentral,875 F.2d at
1029-30 (determining if "Lexis" and "Lexus" were similar, the court engaged in an analysis of
whether someone heating a broadcast announcer articulate the two names would confuse the
two marks).
103. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973).
104. HolidayInns,481 F2d at 450 (citing Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466
F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972) The court stated: "Dilution is a concept most applicable where a
subsequent user uses the trademark of a prior user for product so dissimilar from the product
of the prior user that there is no likelihood of confusion of the products or sources, but where
the use of the trademark by the subsequent user will lessen the uniqueness of the prior user's
mark with the possible future result that a strong mark may become a weak mark. It is not
applicable in this situation, however, because it has been determined that the marks themselves
are not confusing.".
105. See Mead Data Central,875 F.2d at 1026.
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Where the marks at issue are used on competing goods, however, the consumer
confusion between two marks addressed in a dilution analysis is quite similar to the
likelihood of confusion in an infringement analysis. With competing goods, or goods
that are more closely related, consumer confusion between two marks would
necessarily seem to implicate confusion as to source of goods. This is because if a
consumer confuses two marks on competing or closely related goods, there is nothing
to tip the consumer off that he or she is making an incorrect mental association.
Therefore, the argument that consideration of consumer confusion by courts in
analyzing dilution claims is redundant has the most force with respect to dilution
claims involving competing goods.
It is unclear whether the language of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
does anything to avoid the redundancy problem caused by courts' consideration of
confusion in a dilution analysis. The 1995 Act defines dilution as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of... likelihoodofconfusion, mistake, or deception."' 7 This
is a departure from the language of the 1964 Model Dilution Bill,"06 upon which most
of the state dilution statutes, and consequently, most of the relevant case law is based.
The 1964 Model Bill provides that relief shall be granted "notwithstanding... the
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services."'"
Perhaps courts will simply overlook this discrepancy between the language of the
federal Act and state statutes that follow the 1964 Model Bill or conclude that it has
no effect; or perhaps courts will recognize this "likelihood of confusion" language
from the trademark infiringement doctrine and conclude that consideration of confusion
under the federal Act is permissible so long as it does not overlap with specific
likelihood of confusion factors from an infringement analysis. Virtually all the cases
addressing the issue of consumer confusion in the dilution context interpreted statutes
that substantially followed the language the 1964 Model Bill, which provides that
confusion as to source or goods is irrelevant to a dilution cause of action. It is not clear
whether the new federal Act's reliance upon the language from 1992 Model Bill,
making "likelihood of confusion" irrelevant to a dilution claim, will do anything to

106. The author acknowledges that this argument does have its limitations. Given the size
and diversity of some marketing conglomerates and the practice of licensing out the use of
trademarks, the task of determining what kind of a connection between goods or connection
between sources a consumer might find probable is not always simple. See David S.Welkowitz,
Reexamining TrademarkDilution, 44VAND. L. Rnv. 531, 544 (discussing how modem
marketing practices and corporate structure make it hard to describe the dilution process).
107. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985
(1996) (emphasis added).
108. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 12 (1964), reprintedin J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKs AND UNFAIR COMPETIIoN

§ 24.14 (3d ed. 1995).

109. Supra note 108. Most state dilution statutes substantially implement the language of
1964 version of the Model State Trademark Dilution Bill with respect to the confusion issue.
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clarify this issue."' Minnesota, South Carolina, and Washington are the only states
that have used the "likelihood of confusion" language of the 1992 Model Bill, and as
of yet, none of the few cases interpreting these statutes speak to the issue of whether
consumer confusion is relevant to a dilution claim."'
In addition to the Act's lack of guidance on the matter, two factors make it even
harder to predict how courts will apply this "likelihood of confusion' language. First,
is the disagreement among courts over whether confusion should even be considered
in a dilution analysis."' Second, is the lack of legislative history to the Act addressing
this issue."3 The problem of determining just where consumer confusion fits into a
dilution analysis promises to cause continued inconsistencies in the application of the
dilution doctrine, especially where dilution claims involve competing uses. This
problem also threatens to undermine the fundamental justification for the dilution
doctrine as being a remedy that picks up where trademark infringement leaves off.
Congress has left this crucial problem unaddressed in the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995 by failing to define dilution and its related concepts in such a way as to
make clear the distinction between similarity of marks and likelihood of confusion.
In fact the 1995 Act may confuse courts even more, because it uses different language
than the state statutes upon which most of the relevant case law is based.
2. Redundancy By Virtue of the Expansion of TrademarkInfringement
The concept of trademark dilution originated and evolved at a time when the

110. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 13 (1992), reprinted in J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAiR COMPETITION § 24.14 (3d ed. 1995).

111. This conclusion is based upon a WESTLAW search of. Minnesota and Federal Eighth
Circuit cases, using the query, "TRADEMARK AND DILUTION AND CONFUSION AND
325D;" South Carolina and Federal Fourth Circuit cases using the query, "TRADEMARK
AND DILUTION AND CONFUSION;" and Washington and Federal Ninth Circuit cases using
the query, "TRADEMARK AND DILUTION AND CONFUSION AND 19.77" (April 20,
1996). This search revealed that the only case to cite to one of these three state dilution statutes
was Scott v. Mego Int'l, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Minn. 1981), interpreting the Minnesota
dilution statute. In Scott, the court stated that "confusion or the likelihood of confusion is not
a necessary premise to an action for trademark dilution,"without going on to elaborate on
whether "likelihood of confusion" language in the Minnesota statute warranted special
interpretation. Id. at 1137-38 (citing Holiday Inns,Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d

445 (5th Cir. 1973)). The court rejected plaintiff's dilution claim on the grounds that the mark
was not distinctive enough.

112. The reluctance of courts to follow the language of state dilution statutes with respect
to cnfusion has been noted by many commentators. See Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"
Expansion of TrademarkRights: Is a FederalDilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL
LEGIs. J. 433, 439 (1994); David S.Welkowitz, Reexamining TrademarkDilution,44 VAND.
L. REv. 531, 537 (1991); Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationalefor TrademarkTrade Identiy Protection,It's ProgressandProspects,71 Nw. U.L. REv. 618, 621 (1976).

113. This conclusion is based on a LEXIS search of the Legislature Library/Congressional
Record File using the query, "TRADEMARK AND DILUTION AND CONFUSION" (April
25, 1996).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/4
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trademark infringement doctrine provided very little, if any, relief against
noncompeting uses of a trademark." 4 Since then, however, the confusion concept
under the trademark infringement doctrine has been expanded to encompass many of
the injuries to trademark owners that the dilution doctrine was intended to remedy.
The confusion concept as it is applied under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act now
encompasses reverse confusion, post-sale confusion, and subliminal confusion."'
Additionally, the application of the infringement rationale to "related goods,"'1 6 has
extended infringement causes of action to situations in which a plaintiff can show a
likelihood of confusion with respect to a senior user's sponsorship or approval of the
junior user's use." 7
Reverse confusion occurs when a junior user's promotional activities are so
pervasive that consumers are likely to think that the senior user's goods are those of
the junior user, in contrast, traditional forward confusion involves situations where
consumers think the junior user's goods are those of the senior user.1 One of the
leading cases on reverse confusion, Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 9 involved Goodyear's extensively advertised use of the "Bigfoot" mark,
which was already being used by the smaller Big 0 Tire Dealers. The court in Big 0
upheld the trial court's determination that Goodyear had infringed upon Big O's mark
on the basis of likelihood of reverse confusion, and absent any significant forward
confusion. 2
The injury caused by reverse confusion is that "the senior uger loses the value of the
trademark - its product identity, corporate identity, control over its goodwill and
reputation, and ability to move into new markets.'' These injuries are very similar
to the injuries addressed by a dilution claim: the blurring and whittling away of a

114. See Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasisof TrademarkProtection,40 HARv. L.
REv. 813,824-25 (1927). See also J. Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKs AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.19 (3d ed. 1995).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). See Elliot B. Staffin, The DilutionDoctrine: Towards
aReconciliationwith theLanhamAct, 6 FORDHAM hNELL. PROP. MEDIA&ENT. L.J. 105, 160
(1995) (citing Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th
Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed,434 U.S. 1052 (1978)); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l

Ltd., 998 F.2d 985,989 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing,
Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 687 F.2d 563, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1982)).

116. See McCarthy, supra note 114, § 24.03.
117. See Staffin, supranote 115, at 162.

118. See McCarthy, supra note 114, § 23.01(5) McCarthy further explains that with
forward confusion, the senior user loses sales, because consumers mistakenly buy the junior

user's product when they would otherwise likely buy the senior user's product with reverse
confusion the senior user loses the ability of its mark to sustain a product identity, goodwill and
reputation, and an ability of the senior user to move into new markets.
119. 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).

120. Id. at 1371-72.
121. Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960,964 (6th

Cir. 1987) (reversing a lower courfs summary judgement ruling in favor of defendant where
a relatively small oil reclamation company brought suit against a holding company for five Bell
telephone companies for use of its "Ameritech" mark).
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mark's distinctive quality. Because of this similarity, courts' recognition of reverse
confusion in infringement claims does much to contribute to the overlap between
dilution and infringement. 2
Post-sale confusion refers to confusion among non-purchasers when they see a
product already purchased by a consumer and mistakenly believe that the product's
source is the senior trademark holder. For instance, in Payless Shoesource, Inc. v.
Reebok International Limited," Reebok brought trade dress and trademark
infringement claims against Payless Shoesource for its sale of shoes bearing private
"unbranded" labels that were similar in appearance to Reebok's shoes. The appellate
court inPaylessheld that the lower court erred in disregarding the post-sale confusion
caused when a potential consumer observes someone wearing a pair of the Payless
shoes and believes they are Reeboks. 24
The injury caused by such confusion is an increased likelihood that consumers will
attribute the inferior quality of the junior user's goods to the senior user of the mark
or trade dress, which could damage the senior user's reputation and image." By
extending the scope of infringement protection beyond preventing consumer confusion
and into the realm of protecting the senior mark holder, the post-sale confusion
rationale causes infringement and dilution to overlap. Using the fact scenario in Lois
Sportswear, USA. v. Levi Strauss & Co. 26 as an example, if a manufacturer of
denim jeans markets its jeans with a stitching pattern on the back pockets very similar
to the pattern on Levi's jeans, Levi's could conceivably bring both an infringement
claim based on post-sale confusion and a dilution claim. The infringement claim
would be aimed at remedying the damage to Levi's reputation and image by lessening
the ability of the Levi's mark to invoke an association with quality goods in
122. This overlap is illustrated in cases where plaintiffs bring both dilution claims and
infringement claims on the basis of likelihood of reverse confusion. See, e.g., W.W.W.
Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1993) (involving the owner of
"Sportslick" mark for lip balm who brought both a dilution claim and a trademark infringement
claim based on reverse confusion against the owner of "Right Guard Sport Stick" for
deodorant); ComputerAssociates Int'l, Inc. v. AJV Computerized Data Management, Inc., 889
F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving the owner of "CA-Simply Tax" and "Simply Tax"
marks who brought both a dilution claim and a trademark infringement claim based on reverse
confusion against defendant's use of the mark "TAX$IMPLE").
123. 998 F.2d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 989.
125. See Lois Sportswear, U.SA, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir.
1986) (citing Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d
1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975)) (holding that Lois Sportswear's use of a stitching pattern on the
back pocket ofjeans that was similar to Levi's stitching pattern was likely to cause post-sale
confusion, with injury resulting when consumers seeing the familiar stitching on the allegedly
inferior product associate the stitching pattern with Levi's, influencing the consumer's decision
as to whether to later purchase Levi's); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148
(4th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant's use of an embroidered emblem on shirts was
substantially similar to that used on Polo's shirts and this was likely to cause post-sale confusion
that might cause plaintiff's reputation to suffer damage).
126. 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/4
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consumers' minds. A dilution claim would likewise be aimed at protecting the Levi's
mark from losing its ability to create a mental association with quality goods among
consumers. Clearly, there is much overlap between the factual analyses under the two
theories. Essentially, both relate to the lessening of the effectiveness of a plaintiff's
trademark.
Subliminal confusion occurs when a consumer makes a mental association between27
ajunior mark and the senior mark holder's goods without actually being confused.1
The resultifng injury is that subliminal confusion allows the alleged infringer to gain
a foothold in the market by exploiting the subliminal association created with the
senior mark holder.'" The opinion in Dreyfus FundIncorporatedv. Royal Bank of
Canada'29 is a good example of how dilution and infringement can overlap where
subliminal confusion is recognized. In Dreyfus, the court stated that New York's
antidilution law was designed to protect a mark's distinctiveness from being undercut
by a similar use.'-' This is very similar to the stated purpose of remedying subliminal
confusion: to prevent the senior user from being undercut in the market by the junior
user's exploitation of the subliminal association.' The overlap between dilution and
infringement is thus increased when subliminal confusion is recognized within the
infringement analysis.
The application of the infringement doctrine to related but noncompeting goods is
yet one more development in the expansion of infringement analysis that has increased
the overlap between dilution and infringement. A related goods infringement claim
is aimed at confusion as to sponsorship, affiliation or connection, rather than confusion
as to source of goods.'
In other words, there is said to be confusion as to related
goods if a consumer would reasonably believe that the goods at issue are affiliated

127. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414,428
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982)<discussing subliminal confusion as an
additional type of confusion from which Playboy Magazine could obtain relief with respect to
the use ofthe"Playmen" mark on a magazine). The court quoted Londontown Manufacturing
Co.v. CableRaincoatCo., 371 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) as further explanation
of subliminal confusion: "...advertising and trademarks rely on impressions. The consumer
does not memorize the mark. He has a feeling about it from past exposure. That feeling may
be vague, subliminal it is said, but it comes to consciousness when the article is seen with the
trademark affixed."

128. See PlayboyEnterprises,486 F. Supp. at 428; Dreyfus Fund Incorporated v. Royal
Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108,1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting Dreyfus, holder of a mark
consisting of a depiction of a lion, a preliminary injunction to stop defendant's advertising
campaign which utilized a lion; motion was granted in part on basis of subliminal confusion
allowing defendant to gain a foothold into plaintiff's market).
129. 525 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
130. Id. at 1125 (citing Mortellito v. Nina of Calif., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296

(S.D.N.Y. 1972); King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631,638-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1971)).
131. Id. at 1123.
132. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKs AND UNFAiR CoMPETITION
§ 24.01(3) (3d ed. 1995).
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with, connected with, or sponsored by the senior trademark holder."' Such confusion
is easier to show today than it was when the dilution doctrine originated, because of
the increase in such things as mergers, acquisitions and trademark licensing in the
business community. 34 The fact that the related goods doctrine extends the trademark
infringement rationale to apply to noncompeting goods is the primary reason it causes
infringement to overlap with dilution. As discussed earlier, one of the primary
justifications for the dilution doctrine has been that it addresses injuries to trademarks
by uses on noncompeting goods -- injuries traditionally not remedied by the
infringement rationale.'35
Clearly, the concept of confusion within the trademark infringement doctrine has
expanded over past decades into areas covered by the dilution doctrine. This,
combined with the fact that courts sometimes incorporate consideration of consumer
confusion into their dilution analyses, makes the conclusion that infringement and
dilution are to some extent redundant almost unavoidable. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that the dilution doctrine should be abandoned -- just perhaps that its
parameters should be more carefully and clearly defined. One commentator has
suggested, for instance, that the redundancy problem would be lessened if the 1995
Act had specifically limited the dilution doctrine to unauthorized uses of a mark on
noncompeting goods.'36 Such a change would probably help reduce some of the
redundancy because, as the discussion above points out, redundancy is most severe
where the dilution doctrine is applied to competing uses.
Another possibility might be to replace the language in the 1995 Act providing that
"likelihood of confusion" is irrelevant to a dilution claim with language providing that
a dilution claim can only prevail where there is no likelihood of forward confusion,
reverse confusion, post-sale confusion, or subliminal confusion.'37 Although this
133. See Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397,398, cert. denied 488
U.S. 933 (1988) (discussing how a designer infringed upon Mutual of Omaha's indian head
logo through the use of a"Mutant of Omaha" parody on merchandise, because the court found
that there was a likelihood ofconfusion as to whether the insurance company sponsored, or was
affiliated with, the merchandise); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200,204-05 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing a sexually explicit film depicting a cheerleader in
a uniform similar to those worn by the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, the court held that the
consumer need not believe that the trademark owner actually produced and marketed the item,
but merely that the mark owner sponsored or approved of the use).
134. See Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards a Reconciliation with the
Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 162 (1995).

135. See Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasisof TrademarkProtection,40 H-/v.L.
Rnv. 813, 825 (1927).
136. Staffin, supra note 134, at 164. Staffin suggests that rather than stating that dilution
applies "regardless of the presence or absence of competition," the Act should have stated that
dilution applies "despite the absence of competition" or "in the absence of competition".
137. Confusion as to related goods has been omitted from the restrictions because that
would probably limit the dilution doctrine too much. Further changes in the marketplace might
make itreasonable for a consumer to believe that the use of a famous mark on almost any goods
would be affiliated with, coniected with, or sponsored by, the senior mark holder. See Staffin,
supra note 134, at 162.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/4
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restriction would severely limit the scope of the dilution doctrine, it would still allow
dilution remedies in situations such as those used by Schechter in his ground-breaking
article. 3s For example, none of these types of confusion would result, with the
exception perhaps of confusion as to related goods, from the use of the "KODAK"
mark on bicycles.
As the dilution doctrine stands now, years of case law have extended the doctrine
far beyond its originally propounded scope. 3 9 If something is not done to return the
dilution doctrine to its original purpose, or at least to better define its parameters in
relation to trademark infringement, the application of the dilution doctrine will
probably continue to be confused by courts. Consequently, judges and commentators
will probably continue to question the need for the doctrine. Unfortunately, the new
federal Act appears to do little, if anything at all, to remedy this problem.
CONCLUSION

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 is clearly one of the most significant
developments in the history of the dilution doctrine. Among other things, the Act
provides owners of famous trademarks with a dilution remedy that is national in scope,
thus resolving the extraterritoriality issues that marketers using famous marks on a
nationwide basis have faced in the past. As the discussion above has hopefully
revealed, however, the 1995 Act leaves much to be desired for those who would like
to see some of the serious difficulties with respect to the application of the dilution
doctrine cleared up. As indicated above, the most serious of these difficulties, in the
opinion of this author, are the problems of applying the dilution doctrine to quasicommercial speech and the redundancy between dilution and infringement.
The Act's commercial-noncommercial speech dichotomy is a gross
oversimplification of applicable First Amendment jurisprudence. Admittedly, a statute
such as this cannot be expected to incorporate all of the Supreme Court's commercial
speech jurisprudence, but the 1995 Act creates seemingly rigid, bright-line categories
that are likely to be a trap for the unwary. The drafters of the Act at least should have
added a clause providing that the bright-line categories are "subject to equitable
factors from applicable First Amendment doctrine," and at best should have provided

The author acknowledges that restricting the dilution doctrine from situations where reverse
confusion, post-sale confusion, and subliminal confusion can be identified would significantly
reduce the number of plaintiffs relying on a dilution cause of action. For one thing, plaintiffs
would no longer be able to treat "dilution" and "reverse confusion" as interchangeable terms.
See, e.g., Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466,474 (3d Cir. 1994)
(equating dilution of trademark with reverse confusion). The restriction this author proposes,
however, would likely force courts to better delineate the difference between dilution and the
above-mentioned forms of confusion, and hopefully clear up confusion among courts in
applying the doctrine.
138. See Schechter, supra note 135.
139. See Schechter, supra note 135, at 824-25 (making his case for a dilution cause of
action on the basis of there being no remedy for the unauthorized use of a mark on non-related
goods).
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that the bright-line categories are subject to a specific non-exhaustive list of factors
from applicable First Amendment jurisprudence.
The redundancy between dilution and infringement is a serious problem for which
the 1995 Act appears to provide no significant solutions. The applicable case law has
demonstrated that statutes providing that competition and confusion as to source of
goods are irrelevant to a dilution cause of action have not solved the redundancy
problem -- courts have apparently ignored such provisions, or have given them such
a narrow interpretation as to render them essentially ineffective. Consequently, it
seems improbable that the 1995 Act's provision providing that competition and
likelihood of confusion are irrelevant to a dilution claim will be much more effective.
For instance, courts might interpret this provision to only exclude confusion from a
dilution analysis to the extent that it would involve examining all of the Polaroid
factors. 4 A more restrictive and specific setting of the parameters between dilution
and infringement is needed; otherwise, the doctrine may consume itself by creating
perceptions that it is unnecessary and difficult to apply.
Of course, courts might eventually work all of these kinks out on their own. The
history of the dilution doctrine, however, suggests that this is unlikely. It appears that
Congress has simply missed its chance to provide solutions to these problems. We
will probably be struggling with the dilution doctrine for some time to come.

140. See supra note 102.
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